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Source Solicitation Wonderland
Key questions
• Is the bid protest mechanism 
effective?




• Bid protest decisions by GAO and 
COFC 2001-2009
• Government contracts from 
FEDMINE.US; FPDS; Hoovers
Interview Evidence
• Process perceived to be fair
• Unfair results due to inexperience more than bias
• Rejected offerors protest for reasons other than 
quality or fairness of the protest
• Size matters
• Complexity of projects invites protests
Hypotheses
• More bidders, more likelihood of 
protest: yes
• Greater complexity, more likelihood 
of protest: not confirmed
• Smaller the bidder, greater likelihood 
of protest: yes
• U.S. rejected offerer more likely to 
protest than international: yes
Corollaries
• Sustain rate unrelated to number of 
bidders: no, it is
• Greater the project complexity, greater 
the sustain rate: yes
• Small bidder protests less likely to be 
sustained than large bidder: yes
• Sustain rate unrelated to domestic vs. 






Data are for 2004-2009
Missing Information: Missing Protester Number of FTEs: 138 out of 642 cases - 11.1%














Data are for 2004-2009






Recommendations to Retain 
Effectiveness/Improve 
Fairness
• Increase transparency through 
debriefings
• Implement more ADR
• Improve information for monitoring 
and GAO consistency in decisions
